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EquityandHealth
This article raises the problem of equity in the health system in Switzerland. Three dimensions of
theconceptofequityaretakenintoconsideration:theinequalityinthefinancingofthehealthsystem,
the inequality in the distribution of the state of good health, and, finally, the iniquity in the access to
healthcare.Somemethodologicaldevelopmentsarepresentedaswellastheresults.Inconclusionwe
observe that the state of good health does not depend strongly on income but that it exists some




he specific theme of «Equity and Health» was examined by the Laboratory of Applied
Economics and the Department of Econometrics of the Geneva University as part of
a research program called «Sciences, Life, and Society»
1, launched in collaboration with
the universities of Geneva and Lausanne and the Swiss Polytechnic School. The paper presents
a summary of this research and some of the results with respect to Switzerland. The notion
ofequityinthecontextofhealthhastobedefinedmorepreciselyifwewanttoevaluateifahealth
system is equitable. Three dimensions of equity have to be taken into consideration. The first one
concerns the financing of the health system. For a country like Switzerland where this financing
relies, either directly or indirectly through other economic agents, primarily on households, it is
importanttoknowiftheseexpendituresaresupportedbythehouseholdsproportionallytotheir
financialcapacitiesornot.Thefirstsectionofthepaperdiscussesthisproblem.InSwitzerlandthe
expenditures on health per head are very high, but the health situation of the population is yet
verysatisfactory.Thus, thequestioniswhetherthereisinequalitybetweenthedistributionofthe
state of health of the population and the income of the households. This second dimension of
equityinhealthraisestheproblemofthemeasurementofthestateofhealth, astheresultsofthis
measurementarenecessarytobuildaconcentrationcurvetoevaluateifthegoodhealthismore
concentrated in the upper classes of the population. In the second section of the paper we will
present this dimension of equity of the health system. Finally, the third dimension of equity
concerns the access to health care. The question in this case is the following: is there a difference
between poor and wealthy households access to health? The third and final section of this paper
examines the state of research on this question as it concerns Switzerland.
2.  Inequality in the Financing of the Health System
2.1.HealthExpendituresinSwitzerlandanditsFinancingfromaMacro-EconomicPointofView
In 2005, the total cost of the Swiss health system was 53 billion of Swiss francs; this amount
corresponds to 7,059 Swiss francs per head. The cost of health represented 11.6% of Gross
 Российско швейцарский семинар по эконометрике и статистике
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1 This research is part of the IRIS (Integration, Re´gulation et Innovation Sociales) program which joins together the
UniversitiesofGenevaandLausanneandthePolytechnicSchoolofLausanne.Theprogramisfundedbythe«Confe´rence
Universitaire Suisse» and by the already quoted institutions.Domestic Product, which places Switzerland second in the ranking of countries by the
OrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)[SwissFederalStatisticalOffice
(2007)]. In 1990, this ratio was 9.7%; consequently, Switzerland dedicates continuously a greater
part of its resources to the health system.
The purpose of this section is to present the economic agents who pay for the health goods
and services and those who finally support these costs. For the year 2005 we have the following
results.
Table1
Financing of the health system — Economic agents
who paid in the year 2005
Millions of Swiss francs %
Government 8,885.2 16.9
Social Insurances 22,514.6 42.7
Private Insurances 4,674.8 8.9
Households 16,122.7 30.6
Other private agents 500.1 0.9
Total 52,697.3 100
The Government contributes to these expenditures through subsidies; it also supports the
cost of prevention and public health. Both social and private insurances are intermediary agents
thatpaythecostsforthehouseholds.Householdsfinancingcorrespondstotheportionofhealth
goods and services that are not paid by the insurance, as it comes out of pocket money. «Other
private agents» include non-profit organisation.
Table2
Financing of the health system — Economic agents
who supported the cost in the year 2005
Millions of Swiss francs %
Government 14,383.9 27.3
Enterprises 3,525.6 6.7
Private Households 34,787.8 66.0
Total 52,697.3 100
Theincreasingparticipationofthegovernmentisduetoitsfinancingofsocialsecuritybypay-
ing directly or indirectly for health services. The enterprises pay for the social security contributi-
ons of their employees as far as these contributions concern health insurance. Finally, the house-
holds, in addition to their out of pocket expenditures, pay social and/or private insurance health
premiums.
Thepreviouslypresentedmacro-economicdatadonotallowevaluatingifthefinancingofthe
health system is equitable. In order to do so, we had to work with micro-economic data.
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In order to evaluate if the financing of the health system is equitable we have, first, to define
atheoreticalcriterionforequity.Wedefineitasfollows:thehouseholdshavetofinancethehealth
system according to their financial capacity. To verify if this criterion is satisfied we compare the
income inequality before and after the financing of health care. This comparison relies on micro-
economicdatatakenfromtheSwissSurveyofIncomeandExpenditure(SIE)which, unfortunate-
ly, is not specialised in the field of health. The SIE is a survey that measures the incomes and ex-
pendituresofasampleofSwisshouseholds.Theincomesandexpendituresareobservedinequal




data was developed by [Bilger (2005)] and is briefly summarised here.
Firstofall, itisimportanttonoticethatifthefinancingcomponentsofinterestwereobservedat
the micro-level, it would be possible to compute the financing at the same level by using the
sampleweightsprovidedbySwissFederalStatisticalOffice(SFSO).Theideaisthentogobackward
fromthereliablemacro-financingdataavailableinCHSandNAtothecomputationoftheunobser-
ved micro-financing. However, this is not sufficient, and household-level data is needed as well.
A proxy has, thus, to be chosen among variables available in SIE. Moreover, the method requires
theproxyvariabletobeassumedbeingproportionaltotheunobservedfinancingofinterest.Finally,
somebasicalgebraleadstocomputetheunobservedfinancingxibymultiplyingtheproxyvariablepi














where the weight ni represents the number of households in the population corresponding to
household i in the sample and m is the sample size.
Thiscomputationmethodhasbeenusedforthe10healthsystemfinancingcomponentsunder
study, presentedinthesecondcolumnofTable3.Column1inthetablepresentsanaggregationof
these components which is helpful for international comparisons; columns 3 and 4 present
respectively the formulated economic assumptions and the chosen proxy variables.
Table3












State Direct taxes Taxpayers Total amount of direct taxes paid
Consumption taxes Taxpayers Estimated amount of value added tax
Corporate income taxes Taxpayers Total income from interest and dividends






























Social insurances Social health insurance Taxpayers Amount of social health insurance premiums
Accident insurance Employees Amount of accident contributions
Old age and disability
insurance
Employees Sum of old age and disability contributions
Military insurance Military servicemen Number of men of military service age in the
household
Private insurance Taxpayers Total amount of private insurance premiums
Direct payments Households Total amount of expenditure on health3




financial capacity of the household. The total redistributive effect is a measure of the difference
between this norm and the real situation. It can be evaluated through the difference between
theincomeinequalityindicesbeforeandafterthefinancingofhealthcare.Astherelativeinequa-
lityindexdoesnotchangewhenalltheincomesaremodifiedproportionally, proportionalfinan-
cing of the health system will result in the redistributive effect being equal to zero. In the case
of reduction of the inequality this total redistributive effect is positive; it is less than zero when
the inequality is growing. As this measure is greatly aggregated, it does not allow a deep under-
standing of the impact of the health system’s financing on the income distribution. [Aronson
and Lambert (1994)], in the context of taxation, proposed a way to decompose the total redistri-
butive effect into three components: a vertical, a horizontal and a third effect due to the rearran-
gement.
The verticaleffect is a measure of difference of handling persons with different gross incomes.
We want here to compare the contribution of a rich person with that of a poor. If the rich person
needs a larger part of his income to finance the health system than the poor, the vertical effect is
positive, and the inequality in the income distribution diminishes. The financing is a progressive
one. On the contrary, when the vertical effect is negative, the inequality is increasing, and the fi-
nancing is regressive.
The horizontaleffect is a measure of difference of handling persons with the same gross inco-
me.Inthiscaseiftwopersonshavethesameincome, andifoneofthemcontributesmoretothe
financing of the health system, the available income of this person for the consumption of non-
health goods and services will be less than the one of the other individual. The horizontal effect
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3 More precisely, the sum of expenditures on health care and services, as well as the participation in the insurance
costs.
4 Non-profit institutions serving households.measuresthiskindofiniquity.Thismeasurementraisessomeproblemasitisimpossibletoobser-
ve households which are «equal», that is with exactly the same gross income. Aronson and Lam-
bertpassaroundthisdifficultybyreplacingthenotionof«equaltreatmentofequalpersons»with
the notion of «equal treatment of similar persons». This means, that they define intervals of inco-
me in which the households are considered as being equal. This solution is more a compromise
thanasatisfactoryone.[DuclosandLambert(2000)]proposedafullysatisfactorysolutionwiththe
introduction of a continuous measure of the horizontal inequality. This solution is being imple-
mented for Switzerland but is not yet finished. We will, thus, present the results of the Aronson
and Lambert decomposition.
The rearrangement effect shows the importance of reranking in the distribution of individuals
as they are classified with respect to their increasing income, the change being due to the finan-
cing.Thus, ifMr.X.isricherthanMr.Zbeforethefinancingofthehealthsystembutispoorerafter
the financing, we face an equity problem that can be measured through the rearrangement
effect.
The discussion until now has concerned more the definition of the concepts than their mea-
surement. The next section presents the measurement of the redistributive effect as well as the
Aronson and Lambert decomposition.
2.3.2. Aronson and Lambert Decomposition
As already mentioned, the Aronson and Lambert decomposition needs creating groups of
households, whose pre-financing incomes are considered to be close. We, thus, have to choose
a range for the income intervals in which we assume the households are equal with respect to
theirincomes.Thechoiceofthisrangefortheincomeintervalsisnotdiscussedhere, wesuppose,
thus, thatithasalreadybeendone.TheAronsonandLambertdecompositionisbasedontheGini
and the concentration indices.
LetusrecallthattheGiniindexisdefinedbyusingtheLorenzcurvethatrelatesthecumulated
proportions of the population ranked by increasing range of the income to the cumulated pro-
portionsoftheincometheydispose.Thisindexwillbeusedtomeasuretheinequalitybeforeand
afterthefinancingofthehealthsystem.Iftheincomesofallthehouseholdsarethesame, theLo-
renz curve is a straight line; otherwise it is a convex curve that lies under the line of perfect equa-
lity.Theinterpretationofanypointofthiscurveisthefollowing:xpercentofthehouseholdsown
ypercentoftotalincome.TheGiniindexisdefinedasthedoubleofthesurfaceareabetweenthe
Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality.
Aconcentrationindexisdefinedbyusingaconcentrationcurvethathasthesamemeaningas
the Lorenz curve. In such a curve the cumulated proportions on the y axis do not concern the
variable that is used to range the households on the x axis. In this study, the variable with
cumulated frequencies presented on the y axis is the post-financing household income while on
the x axis we use the pre-financing income. The concentration index is the double of the surface
area between the concentration curve and the line of perfect equality.
2.3.3. Graphical Explanation of the Decomposition
The total redistributive effect due to the financing of the health system is measured by the
surface area between two Lorenz curves; the first concerns the pre-financing and the second —
the post-financing incomes. The decomposition is achieved through the construction of two in-


















dtermediary curves that neutralize respectively the horizontal and the rearrangement effect. Figu-
re1showsthisdecomposition.Toevaluatetheverticaleffect, aLorenzcurveofthepost-financing
incomes has to be built that simultaneously neutralizes both the horizontal and the rearrange-
menteffects.Thiscurveiscalled«curveofequaltreatmentofcloseequals».Itisobtainedbyimpu-
ting to each household belonging to a group the same health expenditures amount. The tran-
sition from the Lorenz curve of pre-financing incomes to the curve of equal treatment of close
equals is, thus, only explained by the vertical effect. To evaluate the horizontal effect we have to
neutralizeonlytherearrangementeffect.Thisisdonewiththeconcentrationcurveofthepost-fi-
nancingincomesorderedaccordingtothepre-financingones.Wenoticethatthiscurveisnotal-
ways monotonously increasing. The horizontal effect is then measured by the surface area bet-
ween the concentration curve and the one of «equal treatment of close equals». The rearran-
gementeffectisfinallyevaluatedthroughthesurfacebetweentheLorenzcurveofpost-financing




tions to social and/or private health insurance the households participate in the financing
throughothercontributions, as, forexample, throughthedirecttaxes, whichfinancethegovern-
ment expenditures on health.
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intoitsvertical,horizontal,andrearrangementeffectsConcerning the inequality in the financing we notice that global redistributive effect is nega-
tive, theinequalityinthedistributionofincomeisincreasing.WealsoseefromTable5thatthisre-
sultismostlyexplainedbytheverticaleffectthatcountsfor80.4%ofthetotal.Therearrangement
effect is stronger than the horizontal inequality; they are responsible, respectively, for 16.4% and
3.2% of the total redistributive effect. The component of financing that contributes the most to
theincreaseoftheinequalityisthecontributiontosocialhealthinsurance.Thetotalredistributive
effect of this financing is almost entirely generated through the regressive vertical effect. This
resultreflectsthepolicyusedinSwitzerlandwithrespecttothesocialinsurancepremiums, which
are defined per head without any consideration of the households’income. The second most
negative redistributive effect results from the direct payments. The vertical, horizontal, and rear-
rangementeffectsaccountrespectivelyfor64.2%, 5.9%, and29.9%.Theverticalinequalityisagain
relatively the most important, but the rearrangement is far from being negligible. This can be ex-
plainedbythefactthatthiscontributionisconnectedwiththehealthstateandnotwithincome.
Finally, the financing passing through private health insurance and consumption taxes has also
a negative redistributive effect, whereas direct taxes and corporate income taxes have a propen-
sity to reduce the income inequality.
Table4
Total redistributive effect caused by health system financing components
Health system financing component Financing share
Total redistributive
effect5
Direct taxes 8.96 0.0749
Consumption taxes 5.67 –0.0545
Corporate income taxes 2.32 0.0416
Social health insurance 36.65 –1.1290
Accident insurance 3.71 –0.0017
Old age and disability insurance 5.20 0.0169
Military insurance 0.11 –0.0025
Private health insurance 11.85 –0.1806
Direct payments 24.36 –0.8756
NPIs 1.16 –0.0160
Total health system financing 100.00 –2.3790
Table5












Social health insurance 97.1 2.2 0.7 100
Direct payments 64.2 5.9 29.9 100
Total health system financing 80.4 3.2 16.4 100



















5 The results have been multiplied by 100 for readability.3.  Inequality in Health Status
6
3.1.ContinuousIndicatorsoftheStateofHealth
Swiss Federal Statistical Office carried out in 1992, 1997, and 2002 three «Inquiries on Health».
In these inquiries the state of health is measured by a significant number of ordinal and even
binary variables, but our goal would be to find one or several continuousindicators summarizing
the health potential of an individual on continuous scale. We see that behind the answers
to different health questions from the inquiry, there is a latent but very present variable of the
health itself. Unfortunately, this variable can not be observed, but, fortunately, it can be esti-
mated.
To determine the continuous indicator or indicators of the state of health we propose to use
theLatentVariablesModel, agoodreferencewouldbeabookof[BartholomewandKnott(1999)].
Speakingverygenerally, thismodeltriestofindarelationbetweentheobservedvariables, usually








plaining the answers got for manifest variables. From a practical point of view, we select a set of
manifest variables among those we have from the inquiry. This set should take into account the
subjective, physical as well as the psychological health. The interpretation of the latent variables
should be done, in the end, on the basis of the estimation results. Once the continuous indicator
or indicators are calculated using the Latent Variables Model, we can evaluate the equity in the
distribution of the state of health.
3.2.TheConcentrationCurveandtheInequalityIndex
fortheStateofGoodHealth
To quantify the inequality in the health mentioned before, we propose to use the concentra-
tion index derived from the concentration curve.
The derivation of this curve should be based
1.onthecontinuousmeasureoftheStateofGoodHealth(forwhichthegoodhealthisincrea-
sing in the score) calculated with Latent Variables Model
and
2.onavariableallowingtoobservethesocio-economiccondition(forexample, income, maxi-
mum achieved educational level, consumption expenditures, etc.).
The concentration curve represents on the x axis a cumulated proportion of individuals (once
theyarearrangedbythe«increasing»orderoftheirsocio-economicalstatus)andonthe y axis—
the cumulated proportion of their state of good health.
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6 This section is a summary of [Bilger, Flores et al. (2005)]Then we have three cases to consider
7. First, if everybody has the same share of the good
health independently of his socio-economical status, then the curve coincides with the 45°
diagonal (called the perfect equality line). Second, in the presence of the inequality called «pro-
disadvantaged», theconcentrationcurveremainsovertheperfectequalityline:thefirstxpercent
ofthemostdisadvantagedindividualsownmorethanxpercentofthestateofgoodhealth.Third,
the concentration curve falls under the diagonal if the inequality in the state of good health is
«pro-reach», it means in the favor of more wealthy individuals.
The concentrationindex is a very useful tool to represent in one figure the inequality related to
the socio-economical status of the individuals. Thus, it resembles a bivariate measure of inequa-
lity: it quantifies the inequality of the variable of interest (the good health) in respect to the or-
dering of individuals according to another variable (the income).
The concentration index is evaluated on the basis of the surface area between the concentra-
tioncurveandtheperfectequalityline.Itvariesbetweentheminimumvalueequalto–1andthe
maximum value 1 indicating that, in the first case, all the good health is in the hands of the most
disadvantaged and, in the second, it is fully seized by the individual with the highest socio-
economical status. In the absence of inequality due to the socio-economical status, the index
takesonthevalueof0, whichmeansthateverybodygetstheequivalentpartofthewholestockof
the state of good health.
Note. There exists, additionally, a standardized version of the concentration index adjusted to
asmallnumberofdemographicvariablessuchasageandsex, thisversiongivesaresultcloserto




tive, let us cite subjective health of the individual, the presence of chronic illness, seeing han-
dicap, hearing handicap, walking problem, allergic cold, psychiatric treatment, headache, and
fever. After model estimation, we proceed with two continuous indicators of the state of good
health; one basically represented by the variable mobility (indicator 1) and another by nearly
all manifest variables, except the variable of mobility (indicator 2). Concerning the inequality
relative to the socio-economical status, here expressed by the net personal income of an in-
dividual, Table 6 shows that this inequality is very slightly pro-reach for both dimensions (indica-
tors).
Table6
Concentration index for the Swiss Inquiry on Health, 2002




(significantly different from 0)
0.0231
(significantly different from 0)



















7 In the following analysis we exclude the case where the concentration curve L(r) cuts the diagonal. The expected
results should be «opposite» if we measure the state of bad health.Figure2reproduces, onlyforthefirstindicator, thescoreofgoodhealthforeachindividualas
well as the concentration curve. We note that the concentration curve nearly coincides with the
45° line, confirming that the relative inequality is extremely weak even if significantly different
from 0.
To conclude, we have seen that, henceforth, on the basis of the ordinal as well as binary
variables from categorical inquiries it is possible to establish one or several continuous indicators
of the state of health of an individual. Those indicators are simultaneously characterized by good
statisticalpropertiesandclearinterpretation.UsingSwissInquiryonHealthin2002, wearrivedto
make evident two continuous indicators of the state of health, which distribution is slightly
unequal and in favor of well-off population.
4. Equity in the Access to Health Care
InSwitzerlandthequestionsconcerningtheiniquityrelativelytotheaccessofhealthcarehave
been studied by [Leu and Schellhorn (2004)]. [Flores(2004)] showed that these studies concern
the utilisation of health care by elderly persons and the impact of «franchise»
8 on the demand for
medicalvisit[Schellhornetal.(2000)]and[Schellhorn(2001)].Toanalysethisiniquity, theauthors
useddatafortheyears1981, 1992, 1997, and2002.Thesedatameasuretheaccesstohealthcare
through the total number of medical visits for all types of reasons as well as the number of nights
in the hospital. The most important results obtained are the following: there is no significant
inequalityintheaccesstohealthcarewithregardtoincome, exceptinthedemandforspecialists.
In this case one can presume that the treatment is not the same. The reasons for iniquity are
relatedtotheeducationlevelaswellastothestatusofbeingaretiredperson.Theauthorsdidnot
find any differences in the indicator of iniquity over the time; this could be interpreted as little
influence of the 1996 reform of the health system on the iniquity evolution.
76



















Whilethestateofhealthdoesnotdependstronglyonincome, we, nevertheless, havenoticed
that there exists some iniquity in the use of health services from specialists and that the income
inequality is increasing due to the financing of the health system. The situation of the health
system in Switzerland is, thus, mitigated if we look at it from the point of view of equity. Some
reformsareinpreparationinordertoreducethecostsofhealth, theyconcerntheincreaseofthe
«franchise»aswellasthereductionofthecarespaidbythesocialhealthinsurance.Thesechanges
are justified with regards to efficiency but they could be inappropriate if we consider them in
terms of equity.
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óñëóãàì â ñèñòåìå çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ Øâåéöàðèè. Åñëè ìû õîòèì îïðåäåëèòü, ñïðàâåä-
ëèâëèîí, òîïîíÿòèþ«ðàâíûéäîñòóï»âêîíòåêñòåñèñòåìûçäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿäîëæ-
íî áûòü äàíî áîëåå ÷åòêîå îïðåäåëåíèå. Äëÿ ýòîãî íåîáõîäèìî ðàññìîòðåòü òðè èç-
ìåðåíèÿ ðàâåíñòâà. Ïåðâîå îòíîñèòñÿ ê ôèíàíñèðîâàíèþ ñèñòåìû çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ
èçäåñüíåîáõîäèìîâûÿñíèòü, êàêçàòðàòûäîìîõîçÿéñòâñîîòíîñÿòñÿñèõôèíàíñî-





ðåæäå ÷åì ïûòàòüñÿ îòâåòèòü íà îñíîâíîé âîïðîñ, ïðèâåäåì ñèòóàöèþ ñ ôèíàíñèðî-
âàíèåì ñèñòåìû çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ â Øâåéöàðèè. Â 2005 ãîäó îáùàÿ ñòîèìîñòü øâåé-
öàðñêîé ñèñòåìû çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ ñîñòàâëÿëà 53 ìëðä øâåéöàðñêèõ ôðàíêîâ, ïðè
òîì÷òî66%ýòîéñóììûîïëà÷èâàëèäîìîõîçÿéñòâà.Îñòàâøèåñÿ34%øëèçàñ÷åòãîñóäàðñò-
âåííîãî ñåêòîðà. Äëÿ îöåíêè ðàâåíñòâà ìû ñðàâíèëè íåðàâåíñòâî äîõîäîâ äî è ïîñëå ôè-
íàíñèðîâàíèÿñèñòåìûçäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ.Äàííîåñðàâíåíèåîñíîâàíîíàìèêðîýêîíîìè÷å-
ñêèõäàííûõ, âçÿòûõèç«ÈññëåäîâàíèÿäîõîäîâèðàñõîäîââØâåéöàðèè», ãäå, êñîæàëåíèþ,
íå óäåëÿåòñÿ îñîáîãî âíèìàíèÿ îáëàñòè çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ. Äëÿ îöåíêè ýòèõ ôèíàíñîâûõ
êîìïîíåíòîâ áûë ðàçðàáîòàí ïðîñòîé ìåòîä îöåíêè.




ëîæåíî íà òðè êîìïîíåíòû: âåðòèêàëüíûé, ãîðèçîíòàëüíûé ýôôåêòû è òðåòèé ýôôåêò, âîç-
íèêàþùèé â ðåçóëüòàòå ïåðåðàñïðåäåëåíèÿ. Âåðòèêàëüíûé ýôôåêò ÿâëÿåòñÿ ìåðèëîì
ðàçíèöûâïðåäîñòàâëåíèèìåäèöèíñêèõóñëóãëèöàìñðàçíûìèîáùèìèäîõîäàìè.Âñëó÷àå,
êîãäà âåðòèêàëüíûé ýôôåêò îòðèöàòåëåí, ïðîèñõîäèò óâåëè÷åíèå íåðàâåíñòâà, è ôèíàíñè-
ðîâàíèå ñòàíîâèòñÿ ðåãðåññèâíûì.
Ãîðèçîíòàëüíûé ýôôåêò — óñòàíàâëèâàåò ðàçíèöó â ïðåäîñòàâëåíèè ìåäóñëóã ëèöàì
ñ îäèíàêîâûìè îáùèìè äîõîäàìè.
Ýôôåêòïåðåðàñïðåäåëåíèÿ ïîêàçûâàåò âàæíîñòü ïåðåðàíæèðîâàíèÿ â ñèñòåìå ðàñïðå-
äåëåíèÿìåæäóëèöàìè, êîòîðûåêëàññèôèöèðóþòñÿâñîîòâåòñòâèèñèõðàñòóùèìèäîõîäà-
ìè; ýòî èçìåíåíèå (ïåðåðàíæèðîâàíèå) ÿâëÿåòñÿ ðåçóëüòàòîì ôèíàíñèðîâàíèÿ. Â îòíîøå-
íèèíåðàâåíñòâàâôèíàíñèðîâàíèèíàáëþäàåòñÿ, ÷òîãëîáàëüíûéýôôåêòïåðåðàñïðåäåëå-
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òàêæå âèäèì, ÷òî ýòîò ðåçóëüòàò ÿâëÿåòñÿ, â îñíîâíîì, ñëåäñòâèåì âåðòèêàëüíîãî ýôôåêòà,
êîòîðûé îòâå÷àåò çà 80,4% îáùåãî. Ýôôåêò ïåðåðàñïðåäåëåíèÿ ñèëüíåå, ÷åì ãîðèçîíòàëü-
íîå íåðàâåíñòâî; îí îòâå÷àåò ñîîòâåòñòâåííî çà 16,4% è 3,2% îò îáùåãî ýôôåêòà ïåðåðàñ-
ïðåäåëåíèÿ.Êîìïîíåíòîéôèíàíñèðîâàíèÿ, âíàèáîëüøåéñòåïåíèñïîñîáñòâóþùåéóâåëè-
÷åíèþ íåðàâåíñòâà, ÿâëÿåòñÿ âêëàä â ñèñòåìó ñîöèàëüíîãî ìåäèöèíñêîãî ñòðàõîâàíèÿ. Îá-
ùèé ýôôåêò ïåðåðàñïðåäåëåíèÿ ýòîãî ôèíàíñèðîâàíèÿ ïî÷òè ïîëíîñòüþ ïîëó÷åí îò ðåã-
ðåññèâíîãî âåðòèêàëüíîãî ýôôåêòà.
Â öåëÿõ íàõîæäåíèÿ íåïðåðûâíîãî(ûõ) ïîêàçàòåëÿ(åé) ñîñòîÿíèÿ çäîðîâüÿ ìû ïðåäëàãà-
åì èñïîëüçîâàòü ìîäåëü ëàòåíòíûõ ïåðåìåííûõ. Ñ ñàìîé îáùåé òî÷êè çðåíèÿ, äàííàÿ ìî-
äåëüïûòàåòñÿíàéòèñîîòíîøåíèåìåæäóíàáëþäàåìûìèïåðåìåííûìè, íàçûâàåìûìèâñòà-
òèñòèêå ÿâíûìèïåðåìåííûìè, êîòîðûå â äàííîì êîíòåêñòå ñîîòâåòñòâóþò ïåðåìåííûì, âû-
ÿâëåííûì â ðåçóëüòàòå îïðîñîâ, ïðîâåäåííûõ â Øâåéöàðèè äëÿ èçó÷åíèÿ ñèòóàöèè â ñèñòå-







ãî çíà÷åíèÿ, ðàâíîãî –1, äî ìàêñèìàëüíîãî çíà÷åíèÿ, ðàâíîãî 1, ÷òî ïîêàçûâàåò, â ïåðâîì
ñëó÷àå, ÷òî õîðîøåå ñîñòîÿíèå çäîðîâüÿ íàõîäèòñÿ â ðóêàõ íàèáîëåå îáåçäîëåííûõ ñëîåâ
íàñåëåíèÿ, à âî âòîðîì — ïîëíîñòüþ çàõâà÷åíî ëèöàìè, íàõîäÿùèìèñÿ íà âûñøåé ñòóïåíè
ñîöèàëüíî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé ëåñòíèöû. Â ñëó÷àå îòñóòñòâèÿ íåðàâåíñòâà, îñíîâàííîãî íà
ñîöèàëüíî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêîì ñòàòóñå, èíäåêñ êîíöåíòðàöèè ðàâåí 0, ÷òî îçíà÷àåò, ÷òî õîðî-
øåå ñîñòîÿíèå çäîðîâüÿ ïîðîâíó ðàñïðåäåëåíî ìåæäó âñåìè. Èñïîëüçóÿ îïðîñ, ïðîâåäåí-
íûéâØâåéöàðèèâ2002ãîäóäëÿèçó÷åíèÿñèòóàöèèâñèñòåìåçäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ, ìûâûáðà-




ïðîñòóäà, âûçâàííàÿ àëëåðãèåé; ïñèõèàòðè÷åñêîå çàáîëåâàíèå; ãîëîâíàÿ áîëü è ïîâûøåí-
íàÿ òåìïåðàòóðà. Ïîñëå îöåíêè ìîäåëè ìû ïåðåõîäèì ê ðàññìîòðåíèþ äâóõ íåïðåðûâíûõ
ïîêàçàòåëåé õîðîøåãî ñîñòîÿíèÿ çäîðîâüÿ — îäèí â îñíîâíîì ïðåäñòàâëåí ïåðåìåííîé
ìîáèëüíîñòè (ïîêàçàòåëü1), äðóãîé—ó÷èòûâàåòïî÷òèâñåÿâíûåïåðåìåííûå, çàèñêëþ÷å-
íèåì ïåðåìåííîé ìîáèëüíîñòè (ïîêàçàòåëü 2). Êàñàòåëüíî íåðàâåíñòâà ïî ñîöèàëüíî-
ýêîíîìè÷åñêîìó ñòàòóñó, êîòîðûé çäåñü âûðàæåí ÷èñòûì ëè÷íûì äîõîäîì ðåñïîíäåíòà,
çäåñü äëÿ îáîèõ ïîêàçàòåëåé íàáëþäàåòñÿ íåêîòîðîå íåðàâåíñòâî â ïîëüçó áîãàòûõ ñëîåâ
íàñåëåíèÿ.
Â Øâåéöàðèè âîïðîñû ðàâåíñòâà â îòíîøåíèè äîñòóïà ê ìåäèöèíñêèì óñëóãàì óæå èçó-
÷àëèñü Ëè è Øåëõîðíîì [Leu and Schellhorn (2004)]. Íàèáîëåå âàæíûé ðåçóëüòàò ýòîãî èñ-
ñëåäîâàíèÿ: ñóùåñòâåííîãî íåðàâåíñòâà â îòíîøåíèè äîñòóïà ê ìåäèöèíñêèì óñëóãàì,
îáóñëîâëåííîãî äîõîäàìè, çà èñêëþ÷åíèåì ñïðîñà íà ñïåöèàëèñòîâ — íå íàáëþäàåòñÿ.
Â òàêîì ñëó÷àå ìîæíî ïðåäïîëîæèòü, ÷òî ëå÷åíèå ìîæåò áûòü ðàçëè÷íûì. Ïðè÷èíû íåðà-
















дâåíñòâà ñâÿçàíû ñ îáðàçîâàòåëüíûì óðîâíåì, à òàêæå ñòàòóñîì ïåíñèîíåðà. Àâòîðû íå îá-
íàðóæèëèíèêàêîãîèçìåíåíèÿâïîêàçàòåëÿõíåðàâåíñòâàíàïðîòÿæåíèèâñåãîèçó÷àåìîãî
ïåðèîäà.
Â çàêëþ÷åíèå ìîæíî ñêàçàòü, ÷òî õîðîøåå ñîñòîÿíèå çäîðîâüÿ ñëàáî çàâèñèò îò äîõîäà,
îäíàêîçàìå÷åíî, ÷òîñóùåñòâóåòíåêîåíåðàâåíñòâîâïîëüçîâàíèèóñëóãàìèñïåöèàëèñòîâ,
à òàêæå, ÷òî íåðàâåíñòâî äîõîäîâ óâåëè÷èâàåòñÿ âñëåäñòâèå ôèíàíñèðîâàíèÿ ñèñòåìû
çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ. Òàêèì îáðàçîì, ñèòóàöèÿ â ñèñòåìå çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ Øâåéöàðèè äîñòà-
òî÷íî ñïîêîéíà, åñëè ïîñìîòðåòü íà íåå ñ òî÷êè çðåíèÿ ðàâåíñòâà. Â íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ ðàç-
ðàáàòûâàåòñÿ ðÿä ðåôîðì, íàïðàâëåííûõ íà ñíèæåíèå ñòîèìîñòè ìåäèöèíñêèõ óñëóã, âïîë-
íå îáîñíîâàííûõ ñ ïîçèöèè ýôôåêòèâíîñòè, íî íåïðèåìëåìûõ, åñëè èõ îöåíèâàòü â ïëàíå
ñïðàâåäëèâîñòè.
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